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ABSTRACT 
 
Executive term limits are pre-commitments through which the polity restricts its ability to retain 
a popular executive down the road.  But in recent years, many presidents around the world have 
chosen to remain in office even after their initial maximum term in office has expired. They have 
largely done so by amending the constitution, or sometimes by replacing it entirely. The practice 
of revising higher law for the sake of a particular incumbent raises intriguing issues that touch 
ultimately on the normative justification for term limits in the first place.  This article reviews the 
normative debate over term limits and identifies the key claims of proponents and opponents.  It 
introduces the idea of characterizing term limits as a variety of default rule to be overcome if 
sufficient political support is apparent. It then turns to the historical evidence in order to assess 
the probability of attempts (both successful and unsuccessful) to evade term limits.  It finds that, 
notwithstanding some high profile cases, term limits are observed with remarkable frequency.  
The final section considers alternative institutional designs that might accomplish some of the 
goals of term limits, but finds that none is likely to provide a perfect substitute. Term limits have 
the advantage of clarity, making them relatively easy constitutional rules to enforce, and they 
should be considered an effective part of the arsenal of democratic institutions. 
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ON THE EVASION OF EXECUTIVE TERM LIMITS∗ 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 In late June 2009, the Honduran military escorted sitting President Manuel Zelaya out of 
the country for proposing a referendum that would eliminate constitutional term limits and 
potentially pave the way for his re-election.1 The Honduran Constitution contains a “poison pill” 
clause directed against this very type of proposal, and Zelaya was promptly replaced after 
adjudication of the issue by the country’s Supreme Court.2  The constitutional crisis quickly 
turned into an international one, unresolved as of this writing: a subsequent election (won by the 
conservative opposition candidate) has not been recognized by many countries, and Zelaya’s fate 
as well as that of those or orchestrated his removal is still undetermined.3    
Zelaya can hardly be singled out for trying to overcome constitutional limits on his term.  
In the last fifteen years, many of Zelaya’s counterparts throughout Latin America have 
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1
 Article 239 reads “A citizen who has held the title of the Executive Power may not be President or a 
Designate. He that violates this provision or advocates its amendment, as well as those that directly or 
indirectly support him, shall immediately cease to hold their respective offices and shall be disqualified 
for ten years from exercising any public function." It was this provision that triggered the Honduran 
action. Zelaya’s proposed referendum would have asked voters whether they were in favor of another 
referendum to be held on the next election day on the question of whether to revise the constitution.  
Zelaya’s supporters point out that another President would have been elected on the same day as the 
second referendum, and so Zelaya himself would not benefit.  
2
 The origins of the poison pill are uncertain though the general institution can be traced to Fifth century 
BCE Athens.  Honduras’ constitutions of 1957 and 1982 adopted similar provisions, as did the 
constitutions of Peru 1933 and Guatemala 1945 (art. 133).  Perhaps a more effective mechanism is to 
require that any amendments to the executive term apply only to successors and not the incumbent.  See 
BOL. CONST. art. 135 (1880). 
3
 At this writing, Zelaya is in exile in the Dominican Republic. New York Times Topics, Manuel Zelaya, 
available at 
http://topics.nytimes.com/topics/reference/timestopics/people/z/jose_manuel_zelaya/index.html (last 
checked March 1, 2010). A similar story could be told with regard to Niger President Mamadou Tandja, 
deposed in a coup in February 2010.  Tandja had forced through amendments to the constitution to allow 
himself to remain in office after his term expired. Adam Nossiter, President Claims More Power in 
Niger’s Dispute Referendum, New York Times, Aug. 7, 2009, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/08/world/africa/08niger.html?_r=1 (last checked March 1, 2010). 
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successfully amended or replaced their constitutions to facilitate term extensions.4 The past year 
seems to have been particularly hazardous.  In January of 2009 Bolivian voters approved a new 
constitution relaxing limits on the presidential term thereby allowing incumbent Evo Morales to 
run again. Three weeks later, Hugo Chavez won a referendum amending the Venezuelan 
Constitution to do the same thing.5  In October 2009, the Nicaraguan Constitutional Court 
declared executive term limits to be unconstitutional.  In February 2010, the constitutional court 
in Colombia rejected an attempt to re-amend the constitution to allow a third term for President 
Uribe (the original 1991 constitution limited presidents to one term and a 2005 amendment 
facilitated a second Uribe term).  
Attempts to overturn limits on executive term have little to do with the executive’s 
ideology (Uribe and Chavez are hardly soulmates), nor are they restricted to Latin America. Last 
year Azerbaijan and Niger also adopted referenda overturning term limits.6 Similar movements 
are afoot in the Philippines, though they have so far been unsuccessful.7 Africa has had its share: 
just since 1990, term-limit reform (in the form of relaxing term limits) has been effected in 
Algeria, Cameroon, Chad, Gabon, Guinea, Namibia, Togo, Tunisia and Uganda.8 The 
constitutional choice of presidentialism and semi-presidentialism in Eastern Europe has led to 
tension between temporal rules and ambitious executives there as well. Vladimir Putin opted to 
step down from the Russian presidency in favor of an informally empowered prime ministership, 
which provided him with an unlimited tenure, or at least one at the mercy of a sympathetic 
legislature controlled by his party.9 Term limits have recently been relaxed in several Eastern 
European countries as well, including Belarus, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan.  The 
same dynamics operate at the subnational level where executives of regional and even municipal 
governments face many of the same incentives and institutional constraints. Indeed, Michael 
Bloomberg’s successful amendment of New York City’s charter in order to facilitate his third 
                                                           
4
 A partial list includes Brazil (1997), Argentina (1994), Peru (1993), Venezuela (1999), and Colombia 
(2005). 
5
 It was Chavez’ second try, having failed in a similar referendum in 2007. 
6
 A similar story could be told with regard to Niger President Mamadou Tandja, deposed in a coup in 
February 2010.  Tandja had forced through amendments to the constitution to allow himself to remain in 
office after his term expired. 
7
 This Spring the Philippines House of Representatives passed a resolution that would open the door for 
constitutional amendments. The current issue concerns the scope of foreign investment in certain sectors 
of the economy, but at the same time, the House has been pushing for procedural changes that would 
allow joint voting by both houses as a Constituent Assembly for constitutional changes. The proposal, 
known locally by the unfortunate nickname as Con-Ass, would allow the 254 member House to dominate 
the 24-member Senate. The real subtext, according to many observers, is President Arroyo’s desire to stay 
in office when her current term expires next year. Every President since Corazon Aquino has sought to do 
the same thing. The Constitution currently only allows one six-year term.   
8
 Daniel N. Posner & Daniel J. Young, The Institutionalization of Political Power in Africa, J. 
DEMOCRACY, July 2007, at 126, 126-40.  
9
 Putin can run again for President once he has been out of office for a term, and there are indications that 
he plans to do just that. 
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mayoral term had some comparing the city to a banana republic.10  These varied cases suggest 
that the evasion of term limits is widespread. 
This latest wave of term limit evasions invites a number of questions.  First, how should 
we think of this phenomenon from a normative perspective?  Alexander Hamilton among others 
thought term limits would invite mischief by ex-presidents and argued against their inclusion in 
the United States Constitutions; others, including Thomas Jefferson, thought that term limits 
were necessary to curb executive ambition.  As term limits have grown in popularity over time, 
some have called for their universal adoption in presidential systems as a core feature of 
democracy.11  But term limits have been criticized on a number of grounds, most obviously that 
they restrict democratic choice.  Section I of the article reviews the arguments for and against 
term limits.  It considers motivations grounded in the prevention of tyranny and the protection of 
the institutional integrity of democracy, including countering the incumbency advantage in 
electoral competition. It also introduces the idea that term limits may be most profitably thought 
of as default rules that can be overcome through constitutional amendment processes.   Even if 
term limits appear rigid, they can be overcome by executives with sufficiently strong political 
support. 
Many of the theoretical arguments about term limits turn on empirical claims about the 
likely behavior of the incumbent in their last period of office, an issue about which we have little 
evidence. Other empirical data, however, can inform the broader normative debate.  The 
Honduras situation suggests that term limits might themselves induce constitutional crisis in 
some circumstances.  When a popular leader overturns term limits to remain in office, there may 
be significant collateral damage to the constitutional order.  If such occurrences are frequent and 
their consequences severe, we ought think twice about the suggestion that term limits be seen as 
a core feature of democratic constitutions. To evaluate this possibility, Section II asks the 
positive question of how frequently term limit evasions occur.  It begins by describing the 
prevalence and type of limits on executive tenure across time and space. I then ask whether term 
limits “work,” in the sense of actually and effectively constraining executives from remaining in 
office. This section takes advantage of a unique set of data on the content of historical 
constitutions (the Comparative Constitutions Project).12 This dataset includes information on a 
host of constitutional provisions, including any restrictions on executive tenure. To these de jure 
data, we can compare the de facto record of executive tenure compiled by Goemans, Gleditsch, 
and Chiozza.13 Together these sources can provide a sense of the manner and timing of 
executives leaving office. They also answer some basic empirical questions that have long gone 
unexplored.  I conclude that term limits are surprisingly effective in constraining executives from 
extending their terms, at least in democracies.  There is no evidence that term limits are 
associated with the death or disability of democracy, even if in some circumstances they may 
induce early constitutional replacement.  
                                                           
10
 David W. Chen & Michael Barbaro, Bloomberg Wins 3rd Term as Mayor in Unexpectedly Close Race, 
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 2009. 
11
 Gideon Maltz, The Case for Presidential Term Limits, J. DEMOCRACY, Jan. 2007, at 128, 128-41. 
12
 See Comparative Constitutions Project, http://www.comparativeconstitutionsproject.org (last visited 
Feb.19, 2010). 
13
 Henk E. Goemans, Kristian Skrede Gleditsch & Giacomo Chiozza, Introducing Archigos: A Dataset of 
Political Leaders, 46 J. PEACE RES. 269 (2009). 
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Notwithstanding the generally positive assessment, the third part of the article examines 
institutional alternatives to term limits.  The normative question about term limits must be 
considered as one of comparative institutional choice, and we evaluate whether alternatives 
might mitigate some of the negative effects of term limits identified in the theoretical literature. 
This section considers several ideas, including manipulating the length of the executive term, 
shedding presidential powers, and inducing retirement.  None of the conceivable alternatives to 
restrict executive tenure, however, is likely to substitute for term limits.  As a normative matter, 
then, term limits seem to be an effective form of constitutional pre-commitment.  Despite high-
profile evasions in some countries, the overall story seems to be of an institution that operates as 
an effective constraint in most times and places.  
  
I. THE DEBATE OVER TERM LIMITS 
 
Term limits have been part of the arsenal of institutional design for millennia, but have assumed 
particular significance in modern presidential democracies.  Presidentialism is characterized by 
the election of a single executive for a fixed term of office, and critics of this form of 
government have focused on the resulting inflexibility, particularly as compared to parliamentary 
government.  Limits on the number terms, not just their length, adds yet another dimension of 
inflexibility.14  When the modern presidency was designed in Philadelphia, the founders engaged 
in extensive debates over the length of the term and whether the executive could stand for re-
election.  This section reviews the normative debate over term limits. 
 
A. The Rationale for Fixed Terms: Temporary Insulation 
 
To understand term limits, we must begin by understanding why political systems have fixed 
terms for the executive in the first place.  Fixed terms are a typical feature of presidential 
systems, and are contrasted with the prototypical parliamentary system in which the executive 
can be removed by the legislature at any time.15  I do not wish to rehash the extensive debate 
over these two forms of government here, but rather to focus on one important trade-off.16  
Under either system, periodic elections provide a primary mechanism of ensuring accountability 
of office holders.  Allowing an executive to remain in office for a set period insulates that 
executive from short-term fluctuations in political opinion.  This can facilitate the undertaking of 
policies that might entail short term costs, but produce benefits in the mid-term.   Thus fixed 
terms allow for periods of insulation set off by elections that secure legitimacy and 
accountability.  In most parliamentary systems, the executive and the legislature exist in a certain 
co-dependence, in which one office may be dissolved by the other at any given time.  In 
presidential systems, the president and the legislature enjoy fixed terms and are thus insulated 
                                                           
14
 See, for example, Juan Linz, The Perils of Presidentialism, 1 JOURNAL OF DEMOCRACY (2009). 
15
 To be sure this is an oversimplification, and some have argued that parliamentary systems can 
accommodate fixed terms. Richard Albert, The Fusion of Presidentialism and Parliamentarism, 57 AM. J. 
COMP. L. 531, 558 (2009).  Albert also points out that the potential for recall in presidential systems is the 
functional equivalent of the vote of no confidence in parliamentary systems. Id. at 560. 
16See generally JOSÉ ANTÔNIO CHEIBUB, PRESIDENTIALISM, PARLIAMENTARISM AND DEMOCRACY 
(2007) (reviewing scholarly debate over presidentialism and parliamentarism). 
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from one another and from short term fluctuations in public opinion.  Insulation must be 
tempered with periodic elections, which confirm the mandate of the office holder for another 
term of office. 
 It is difficult ex ante to determine the “optimal” term for an office holder, by which I 
mean the length of time in which the benefits of policy insulation outweigh the costs of reduced 
accountability. As noted below, there is surprisingly little variation across written constitutions in 
length of executive term, even though the time required to develop, implement, and evaluate 
policies will co-vary across time and space with a number of factors.  These factors may include 
other features of the constitutional structure (such as the existence of veto players) as well as 
exogenous conditions (such as the rate of social and political change).  Other factors such as the 
structure of the party system and individual characteristics of the leader are surely relevant.  It is 
likely that the optimal term would be different across policy areas, as costs and benefits of 
policies may be revealed at different rates, and so a fixed term for a single executive is simply 
the aggregate of an optimizing function over individual issue areas.  The approach of fixing 
terms is to adopt a bright-line rule for periodic elections, notwithstanding the fact that the 
optimal amount of time for an executive to stay in office may in some instances be much shorter 
or longer.   
 Fixed terms have been at the center of criticisms of presidential democracy associated 
with Juan Linz, among others.17 Among other vices, Linz sees presidential systems as 
institutionalizing conflict between branches, leading to deadlock and higher incentives to take 
extra-constitutional action.  As Mainwaring and Scully put it: “because of fixed terms of office, 
if a president is unable to implement her/his program, there is no alternative but deadlock.”18  
While the current state of the literature is more agnostic,19 the assumptions of the Linzian 
position are still widely held. The focus here is not on fixed terms per se, but on whether a 
system ought to limit the number of fixed terms a single individual can hold. 
 
B. Arguments for Executive Term Limits 
 
The origins of executive term limits go back as far as the ancient Republics. In one of the 
earliest definitions of democracy, Aristotle listed as a key characteristic of democracy that “no 
man should hold the same office twice.”20 Accordingly, Greek city states are known to have 
imposed one-year limits on some of the officials elected by random lottery.21  In Athens, there 
was the additional restriction that no individual could serve more than two terms on the 
                                                           
17
 Juan J. Linz, Presidential or Parliamentary Democracy: Does It Make a Difference? in THE FAILURE 
OF PRESIDENTIAL DEMOCRACY, 2  (Juan J. Linz & Arturo Valenzula ed., 1994); Linz, supra n.14. 
18
 BUILDING DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS: PARTY SYSTEMS IN LATIN AMERICA 33 (Scott Mainwaring & 
Timothy R. Scully eds., 1995); but see Jide O. Nzelibe and Matthew C. Stephenson, Complementary 
Constraints: Separation of Powers, Rational Voting and Constitutional Design, 123 Harv. L. Rev. 618, 
643-45 (2010) (separation of powers does not induce gridlock). 
19
 CHEIBUB, supra n. 15. 
20
 THE POLITICS OF ARISTOTLE 258 (Ernest Barker trans., Oxford University Press 1958). 
21
 CHARLES C. HIGNETT, A HISTORY OF THE ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION TO THE END OF THE FIFTH 
CENTURY B.C. 237 (1952) 
Executive Term Limits 
 
8 
governing council in the course of a lifetime.22 The rationale for term limits in these early 
democracies was the idea of rotation of office.  Democracy required that citizens have the 
experience of both “ruling and being ruled in turn” and this principle was best effectuated with a 
strict limitation on tenure in public office, so as to maximize the number of citizens that could 
govern.23 
In polities larger than a city-state, the ideal of each citizen having a real possibility of 
holding public office is a fiction.    Accordingly, we have observed some evolution in normative 
thinking about the rationale for term limits.  In the modern consideration of term limits, the 
themes of tyranny and the protection of electoral competition have come to the fore, with ideas 
about self-government losing salience.  
The touchstone of current views is the American founding.   The founding fathers in the 
United States debated the length of the presidential term, including the question of whether re-
election ought to be allowed. The initial version of the Virginia Plan submitted to the 
Constitutional Convention provided that the president would be ineligible for a second term.24  
This position remained in place while various proposals for term length were debated. Until 
close to the end of the Constitutional Convention, the founders’ plan was to have the president 
limited to a single seven-year term.25 Many of the framers were concerned that the prospect of 
re-election would force the president to curry favor with Congress, an undesirable outcome that 
they associated with failing to take into account the national interest.26 In the end, of course, the 
U.S. constitution initially omitted term limits, much to the chagrin of Thomas Jefferson, who 
declared the omission to be one of the defects of the document.27 
Those in favor of term limits focus on the potential for tyranny by an executive. As 
Simon Bolivar put it (before reversing his position once he assumed executive office himself) 
“Nothing is more perilous than to permit one citizen to retain power for an extended period. The 
people become accustomed to obeying him, and he forms the habit of commanding them; herein 
lie the origins of usurpation and tyranny….Our citizens must with good reason learn to fear lest 
the magistrate who has governed them long will govern them forever.”28 Bolivar identifies the 
perverse advantages of incumbency: the current office-holder can, either intentionally or not, 
come to seem like the only alternative.   
While it is possible that the incumbency advantage is simply a function of better 
information on the current office-holder than on the challenger, it is also possible that it results 
                                                           
22
 GIDEON DORON & MICHAEL HARRIS, TERM LIMITS 5 (2001). 
23
 Id. 
24
 CHARLES W. STEIN, THE THIRD TERM TRADITION: ITS RISE AND COLLAPSE IN AMERICAN POLITICS 3 
(1943). 
25
 Id. at 2. 
26
 Id at 6 (describing position of George Mason of Virginia). 
27
 Thomas Jefferson, Letter to James Madison, December 20, 1787 (expressing concern over incumbency 
advantage and stating that “the power of removing him every fourth year by the vote of the people is a 
power which will not be exercised.”) 
28
 John M. Carey, The Reelection Debate in Latin America, in LATIN AMERICAN DEMOCRATIC 
TRANSFORMATIONS: INSTITUTIONS, ACTORS, AND PROCESSES 79, 80 (William C. Smith ed., 2009). 
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from cognitive biases in favor of stability: better the proverbial “devil you know” than a possibly 
unproven candidate.  In modern psychological terms, this implicates the status quo bias, through 
which people stick with earlier choices without adequately considering alternatives.29 In 
addition, incumbents have well-documented advantages in political competition because of 
agenda control, greater media coverage and control over the instruments of power.  Incumbents 
may even be tempted to improperly utilize public resources in pursuit of remaining in office.  
Besides these direct advantages, incumbency also has indirect effects on political 
competition. Incumbency can indirectly serve as a barrier to entry, so that other good candidates 
might refrain from entering a contest against an established incumbent.30 Analogizing to antitrust 
law, regulation may be an appropriate solution to address these potential distortions in the 
political marketplace. 
Term limits form a kind of pre-commitment by the polity to consider alternative 
candidates.  Like all pre-commitments, term limits rest on a claim that some judgments are better 
made earlier rather than later because the agent cannot be trusted to make the right call down the 
road.31  As an incumbent serves in office, the ability of the polity to evaluate performance and 
provide electoral discipline somehow becomes distorted.  Hence there is a need to categorically 
restrict candidates from re-upping. At the time of adoption of the constitution, the polity limits its 
own will down the road, a paradigmatic pre-commitment.32 The pre-commitment is grounded in 
the judgment ex ante that discarding all executives after a fixed term will produce aggregate 
benefits, even though we will lose the services of some executives that we would really want to 
keep. 
A pre-commitment to change executives may have beneficial upstream effects on the 
selection of candidates who make themselves available to run for office.  Knowing ex ante that 
their tenure in public office is (at least presumptively) limited, self aggrandizing agents may be 
deterred from seeking office in the first place.  Agents who wish to rule for life will be screened 
out, or at least will be discouraged from running for public office.  In contrast, a term limit will 
encourage agents who have moderate ambition to enter political competition.  Term limits thus 
affect the labor pool of candidates. 
Another positive effect of term limits might operate on potential challengers for power.  
In the absence of term limits, an incumbent may govern for too long, and potential challengers 
might grow impatient.  The pre-commitment to rotating leaders will assure such challengers that 
they will indeed have a chance of winning office.  Broadly speaking, then, term limits reduce the 
stakes of politics, and may prevent alternate candidates from resorting to unconstitutional 
action.33 
                                                           
29
 Daniel Kahnemann, Jack L. Knetsch; Richard H. Thaler, Anomalies: The Endowment Effect, Loss 
Aversion, and Status Quo Bias, 5 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 193 (1991).  
30
 Einer Elhauge, Are Term Limits Undemocratic?, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 83, 154-65 (1997). 
31
 STEPHEN HOLMES, PASSIONS AND CONSTRAINT: ON THE THEORY OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACY (1995). 
32
 Indeed, term limits exemplify an institution that is better analyzed using pre-commitment theory than 
agency cost theories of constitutionalism.  Term limits operate even if the agent retains popularity, and 
indeed only make sense because the agent may retain popularity.  The Polity limits its own will down the 
road, even if there are no agency costs. 
33
 Barry Weingast, Designing a Constitution that will Last, in DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN 
AND PUBLIC POLICY: ANALYSIS AND EVIDENCE (Roger Congleton and Birgitta Swedenborg, eds., 2006). 
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In preventing incumbent leaders from running, term limits change the incentives for 
politicians in their final period of office.  Some have argued that term limits will lead executives 
to focus more on the public interest if not concerned about the need for re-election, even if they 
may be underpowered in their lame-duck status.34 Certainly, term limits reduce the risk of 
manipulation of policy by the executive to maintain power, at least to the extent that the 
restrictions are effectively enforced. 
Term limits also promote a party-based, as opposed to personality-based, vision of 
democracy. Term limits assume that, ultimately, no one individual, no matter how competent and 
exalted, has a monopoly on the skills needed to govern. By forcing even highly competent and 
popular leaders to stand down, term limits encourage the cultivation of successors as well as the 
creation of robust political parties to maintain the leader’s policies into the future.  Channeling 
ambition to others can have the important benefit of preventing personality from trumping 
policy.35 
 
C. Arguments Against Executive Term Limits 
 
The primary objection to term limits is rooted in concerns about representation. Term 
limits serve as an artificial and illiberal constraint on the choice of the polity from retaining an 
executive who it may otherwise wish to keep. In theory, the polity can always vote the 
incumbent out of office it so chooses, and so there is no need to categorically limit candidates 
from continued participation in elections. This argument has been adopted by both scholars and 
courts.36  
The standard rebuttal is that term limits are typically adopted by democratic majorities as 
part of a package of constitutional commitments. Like other pre-commitments, term limits can be 
reversed by downstream amendment. But inclusion of such limits in the constitutional text shifts 
the default position to removing office-holders.  This may have illiberal consequences when the 
voters prefer to retain the person in office. Indeed, it is only because of such presumed efficacy 
that the founders adopt term limits in the first place. 
Opponents of term limits also argue that governance, like other activity, requires 
experience, and that practitioners of government may get better over time.37 This argument was 
associated with David Hume, who critiqued James Harrington’s scheme of government in The 
Commonwealth of Oceana on the grounds that forcing executives out of power would deprive 
the polity of the best possible leaders.38 Hume saw no benefit in artificial rotation among 
officeholders, and suggested that an ideal scheme of government would not have term limits. 
                                                           
34
 Carey, supra note 28. 
35
 For an example of a leader who has refused to create a party or designate a successor, consider Hamid 
Karzai of Afghanistan.  See Karzai, A Man with No Party, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, OCT. 26, 2004, 
available at http://www.csmonitor.com/2004/1026/p01s03-wosc.html (last checked March 2, 2010). 
36
 U.S. Term Limits v. Thornton, 512 U.S. 1286 (1994). 
37
 Nelson W. Polsby, Constitutional Mischief: What’s Wrong with Term Limitations, AM. PROSPECT, 
Summer 1991, at 40. 
38David, Hume, IDEA OF A PERFECT COMMONWEALTH (1752 (“rotation is inconvenient, by throwing men, 
of whatever abilities, by intervals, out of public employments.”) Hume’s essay emphasizes the cultivation 
of expertise over time, limiting higher office to those who have already held lower office. 
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The argument about expertise was repeated by Alexander Hamilton, a principal opponent 
of term limits in debates over the United States Constitution. Hamilton thought that a limitation 
on the presidential term involved “the banishing [of] men from station, in which, in certain 
emergencies of the state, their presence might be of the greatest moment to the public interest 
and safety.”39  Hamilton’s concern was not only experience but the related concern of a uniquely 
qualified leader.  This may be particularly important in new states or fragile democracies, and 
many of the founders may have had George Washington in mind when thinking about the 
problem of term limits.40  Artificially forcing uniquely qualified individuals from office, it is 
argued, can deprive the state of the best possible leadership and risk undermining the social basis 
for the state. (The list of people who have made such claims, however, invites skepticism.)41 
Another issue expressed by opponents concerns the role of ex-leaders.  In Federalist 72, 
Hamilton worried about the effects on politics “to have half a dozen men who had credit enough 
to be raised to the seat of the supreme magistracy wandering among the people like discontented 
ghosts, and sighing for a place which they were destined never more to possess.”42  These sorts 
of ghosts sometimes seem to stalk the halls of power in Latin America: Peron in Argentina, for 
example, cast a long shadow over politics long after the term of office ended. In the United 
States, at least, ex-Presidents seem to thrive out of office (sometimes as minimally meddlesome 
statesmen) and cause very little mischief.43  Gideon Maltz, who has written in favor of term 
limits, recommends the practice of maintaining the trappings of executive office (such as a 
security detail or honorary positions) as a way to incentivize more statesman-like behavior by ex- 
presidents.44 
Hamilton was particularly concerned with the potential for manipulation by a term-
limited leader to remain in office. As he put it, “(A)s the object of his ambition would be to 
prolong his power, it is probable that in case of a war, he would avail himself of the emergency 
to evade or refuse a degradation from his place.”45  For this reason Hamilton favored a life term 
during good behavior, a kind of elective monarchy for the United States that in any event would 
not have a large quantum of power.46  
                                                           
39
 See also STEIN, supra note 17, at 12 (Luther Martin expressing similar idea). 
40
 Maltz, supra note 10, at 128-41. 
41
 Contrast Nursultan Nazarbayev, who is in the process of amending the constitution to name himself 
President for life of Kazakhstan, with Nelson Mandela, the embodiment of South Africa’s democratic 
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Another founding father, Gouverneur Morris, eloquently made a similar argument that 
the final period would induce unconstitutional behavior by a leader.47  Should the possibility of 
re-election be foreclosed, he argued, a leader may seek to retain it by the sword.48 Furthermore, 
the short but definite period of a single term would tempt the president to accumulate wealth 
quickly while in office, as there would be no electoral discipline to induce public-regarding 
behavior.49 It was this argument that seemed to carry the day in the heated final days of the 
Constitutional Convention: though the final text remains silent on re-eligibility, it was assumed 
to be permissible.50 
One point of disagreement apparent in the debate is that opponents of term limits tend 
toward a different interpretation of likely executive behavior in the final term.  While proponents 
argue that term limits will free up the executive to act in the public interest, opponents note that 
the lack of electoral check can also give way to corruption and pursuit of policies for personal 
gain.51 It may therefore make sense to incentivize leaders with the possibility of continued office 
to avoid last-period problems. Ultimately, whether public- or private-regarding motivation 
predominates in the final period of office is an empirical question on which there has been little 
work. 
Another empirical question unresolved in the current literature concerns the interaction of 
the incumbency advantage and time.  Specifically, does the degree of incumbency advantage 
generally remain constant over time, or does it increase or decrease?  If it generally decreases 
after a certain point, term limits may be unnecessary.  On the other hand, if it continues to 
increase with the term of the incumbent, term limits are more justifiable. There is  no literature 
that estimates the slope of the incumbency advantage as a function of time.  With no other 
evidence, we assume that it is flat for purposes of the analysis in this article. 
 
 
D. A Qualified Approach: Term Limits as Default Rules 
 
Term limits involve a trade-off, restricting voter choice in order to preserve an equitable 
political marketplace.  Limits are perceived as both anti-democratic and essential to preserve 
democracy, and much of the argument turns on underspecified claims regarding the optimal term 
of office, the effects of incumbency, and the nature of final-period problems. In this section, we 
analyze constitutional term limits from the perspective of default rules, showing that term limits 
are more flexible than they appear to be. 
Return to the rationale for a fixed term in the first place.  Fixed terms provide for 
insulation, allowing pursuit of mid-term over short-term considerations.  Ex ante, however, the 
optimal duration of executive tenure is not obvious, and may vary with a number of 
considerations, including aspects of the international environment, domestic stability, and the 
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presence of alternative leaders.  We cannot be sure that the blanket fixed term specified for the 
executive is ideal in any sense. A parliamentary system may allow for more flexibility in 
response to changing conditions, in that underperforming executives can be removed relatively 
easily.  But while parliamentary systems address the problem of the underperforming leader 
staying too long, they allow for performing leaders to stay in office forever, and hence 
exacerbate incumbency advantages.  Term limits, on the other hand, place an upper limit on the 
duration of service, mitigating incumbency advantages but raising the possibility that an 
effective leader will be forced out of office too early. 
Term limits, however, are no more entrenched than any other constitutional provision 
(the unusual Honduran “poison pill” notwithstanding).  The possibility that term limits can be 
bypassed by constitutional amendment (either negotiated or obtained through referendum) or 
replacement suggests that executive term limits might be usefully thought of as merely default 
rules. They can be effective only so long as the polity does not amend around them. To be sure 
they raise the cost of extending tenure. But a truly popular executive will find them of little 
constraint. Franklin Roosevelt, for example, initially denied wishing to run again in 1940 after 
his second term, in keeping with the unwritten constitutional norm of the time.52 But with the 
New Deal in full swing, his popularity was such that his party insisted that he run again. Term 
limits did form some constraint, in that Roosevelt’s popularity had to be high enough to 
overcome the default norm of the unwritten constitution: no doubt some (unspecified) number of 
voters who might otherwise be inclined to vote for him declined to do so because of the 
unwritten limitation. But the threshold could be overcome. Once the 22nd amendment was 
adopted, the degree of political support necessary shifted again: a future president would require 
enough support to sustain a constitutional amendment reversing the 22nd amendment, a much 
higher threshold.53  
Term limits can be thus said to raise the degree of political support required for an 
executive to maintain office from the ordinary electoral majority to the amendment threshold 
(which we can think of as a supermajority, although amendment provisions vary). It is not clear 
ex ante that the amendment threshold is always optimal, however, in terms of offsetting the 
incumbency advantage. It may be that the amendment threshold is too low, so that it does not 
constrain the executive in any real way.  Alternatively, the amendment threshold may be so high 
as to exceed the incumbency advantage. In such instances, a popular president whom the polity 
would otherwise prefer to retain will be forced to leave office because of term limits.   
To illustrate, suppose that the net advantage of being an incumbent in presidential 
elections is 10 percent, the average incumbency advantage for members of the U.S. Congress 
since 1975.54 This means that a candidate will obtain the additional votes of 10 percent of the 
electorate relative to the support she would receive were she not an incumbent.  Suppose further 
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that the incumbent candidate is forbidden by the constitution from running for a second term, but 
the constitution can be amended by referendum with the support of two-thirds of the population.  
In this example, the amendment supermajority exceeds a majority plus the incumbency 
advantage.  An incumbent who has the support of 62% of the population would have been 
elected by a majority (even without the incumbency advantage) but will be prevented from 
running by term limits. An incumbent who has the support of 70% of the public, on the other 
hand, will be able to secure an amendment and remain in office.  Arguably the term limit rule in 
this example is excessively restrictive: it does more than simply offset the incumbency 
advantage.   
 By providing for an absolute upper bound on executive service, without regard to 
external conditions, term limits are a blunt instrument to deal with a delicate but real problem—
the proverbial sledgehammer used to crack a nut.  It is possible, of course, that in establishing a 
fixed maximum term to be applied to all executives, we manage to choose a period of years that 
is perfectly optimal, such that it allows the executive sufficient time to develop policies without 
fear of losing power.  We may force some truly popular executives to stand down in favor of less 
competent candidates, but the cost is worth it because of the risks of declining performance from 
an executive that stays past their optimal date.  In short, we might by chance set the maximum 
term for a period that is, as Goldilocks would put it, neither too hot nor too cold.  But this seems 
unlikely given variation in the myriad factors that will affect the optimal term. 
Most problematic is the possibility that term limits might induce constitutional crises. By 
constitutional crises, I mean a situation in which constitutional politics become so heated that 
they suspend the operation of normal politics.55 Constitutional politics are those that involve 
struggles over the meaning and enforcement of the constitution; ordinary politics involve issues 
to be decided within the governance structure established by the constitution.56 When an 
executive suspends the operation of term limits in order to remain in power, there is likely to be a 
severe reaction from other parts of the political system and this can suspend ordinary political 
processes.  This was one of the concerns that Hamilton raised in opposition to the limited and 
fixed term of office.57 
These crises do not always rise to the level of midnight abductions of the President a la 
the Honduran case.  However, street protests, name calling, and lamentations about the country’s 
standing as a “democracy” are not infrequent.  It seems very clear that an executive who reaches 
the end of her allowed tenure, remains highly popular, and wishes to stay presents her citizens 
with an unhappy dilemma.  The resulting conflict is one between a majority (or plurality) that 
yearns for “four [or five or six] more years” and a minority that demands the implementation of 
constitutional rules.  Either side can make a compelling argument for their position from the 
perspective of democratic theory, but a satisfactory reconciliation of the two sides is unlikely.  
Furthermore, the personalization of the conflict—over whether a particular individual can retain 
                                                           
55
 Compare Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermuele, Constitutional Showdowns, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 991 
(2008). 
56
 JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT, LOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY (1962). 
57
 Text at note 42, supra. 
Executive Term Limits 
 
15 
office--distinguishes a term limits crisis from other types of constitutional crisis which might 
arguably have beneficial effects down the road.58 
Four resolutions to the crisis are possible, all with varying welfare consequences.  The 
possible resolutions are: (1) the executive departs; (2) the executive remains and amends the 
constitution; (3) the executive remains and replaces the constitution; and (4) the executive 
remains and ignores the constitution. The first outcome – the only one in which term limits work 
as designed -- is seemingly unproblematic, except for those who argue (reasonably) that the 
executive’s departure denies the majority’s will.59  The second and third outcomes represent two 
methods of constitutional adaptation, with one preserving the constitution and the other 
eviscerating it. While I remain agnostic about the effects of amendment to abolish term limits, 
replacement seems to be of greater concern. In part this is because the welfare effects of 
constitutional replacement can be negative.60   Replacing a constitution entails costly 
renegotiation along many dimensions and can perpetuate broader instability.  The fourth 
solution, in which an executive remains without any legal basis, may undermine the very idea of 
a constitutional order more broadly. In short, replacement and ignoring the constitution will have 
systemic consequences, while the departure of the executive will also leave the polity devoid of 
an effective or popular leader. 
Even the second solution (amendment) may be problematic, though it adheres nominally 
to constitutional guidelines.  Democracy is ultimately about processes, not personalities, and 
there is something unseemly about rulers who re-engineer higher law to facilitate personal 
ambition.  Of course, one might adopt a qualified approach to amendments designed to evade 
term limits by focusing on the process of evasion. Carey distinguishes extensions of executive 
term brought about by negotiations between the president and opposition from those brought 
about by plebiscite.61  In the former case (which he associates with strategies chosen by Latin 
American leaders Carlos Menem, Fernando Cardoso, and Alberto Uribe) the extension of term is 
accompanied by limits on power, and so the risk of tyranny is mitigated. With referenda, 
subsequent constraints on the executive may be less effective.  Another alternative is informal 
amendment through supreme or constitutional court interpretation, as in Nicaragua, Ukraine and 
Kyrgyzstan. 
In short, the normative debate over term limits turns on various empirical and theoretical 
claims.  Proponents fear executive tyranny, and more generally the effects of incumbency on 
political competition.  They also believe there to be positive benefits from encouraging leaders to 
develop successors and political organizations that can extend their policies into the future.  
Opponents argue that term limits are anti-democratic and form an artificial restriction on choice.   
Whatever benefits are associated with term limits, they seem to be a relatively crude 
instrument because we have no reason to think that the maximum legal term will always or even 
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typically correspond with the optimal term of office. That optimal period will be determined by a 
whole array of exogenous factors, including the extent of dynamic inconsistency problems, the 
international environment, and the level of incumbency advantage.  In addition, this article 
emphasizes that term limits, whatever their benefits, have the distinct disadvantage of inducing 
constitutional crises for which there exist few appealing solutions. The frequency of such crises 
is explored in the next section. To be sure, there are many settings in which term limits appear to 
function without inviting crisis, such as the United States and Mexico.  One wonders whether 
these settings are immune from crisis, or simply whether an executive that is young enough and 
popular enough has not managed to tempt supporters to challenge the law.62   
One implication of this analysis is that empirical inquiry can inform the normative  
debate.  We have, as yet, very little information on the frequency with which term limits are 
adopted and subsequently evaded.  We also need a better sense of how often crises arise 
historically and how they are typically resolved. The next section begins to provide some 
documentation of the frequency of term limits and evasions. 
 
 
 
II. EXECUTIVE TERM LIMITS: THEIR TYPES AND INCIDENCE 
 
We define an executive term limit as a constitutional restriction on the number of fixed 
terms (consecutive or otherwise) the head of state can serve. In this sense it is a species of 
qualification for office, akin to age and other constitutional provisions that restrict candidate 
entry and, thus, voters’ choice in some way. The focus in this article is exclusively on executives 
and not legislators, even though some of the same issues arise with limits on either office. 
Although most of the literature in the United States has focused on legislative term limits,63 term 
limits on legislators are rare outside the United States. On the other hand, limits on the head of 
state’s term are a characteristic of the majority of fixed-term (presidential) systems of 
government and apply to both “real” and figurehead heads of state.  
As mentioned in Part I, the ancient Greeks developed the idea of term limits to promote 
rotation in office. This principle also seems to run through the architecture of the Roman 
republic, where consuls served for only one year.64 Drafters at the beginning of the modern 
constitutional era (the turn of the eighteenth century) were informed by classical models of 
democracy and certainly saw term limits as a viable option as well.  The U.S. founders engaged 
in a vigorous debate on the subject, both during and after the Philadelphia sessions, described 
briefly above, but allowed executive re-election. Regardless, George Washington left office after 
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two terms and set a precedent that would be followed by the next thirty presidents, including 
some such as Jefferson and Jackson that could easily have won a third term.65 By at least the late 
nineteenth century, then, the two-term stay was considered an unwritten constitutional norm in 
the United States.66 Only when Franklin Roosevelt violated this unwritten norm was the rule 
formalized in the form of 22nd amendment.67 As we shall see shortly, constitution-makers in 
Latin America pointedly ignored the U.S. lead and explicitly adopted term limits almost 
universally from the start.68 Executive term limits are thus a central democratic institution 
associated with national constitutions from very early on.  
We can get a better sense of this history by consulting the data on constitutions in the 
Comparative Constitutions Project.69 In that project, co-authors and I have collected the written 
constitutions for all independent countries since 1789 and recorded their characteristics across a 
wide number of dimensions. Our current sample includes 619 constitutional systems from the 
universe of 960 systems that we have identified as existing in independent states (including 
microstates) from 1789 to 2006. Overall, some forty-three percent of these constitutions (n=269) 
place some limit on the number of terms the head of state is eligible to serve.  However, if we 
consider only the 428 constitutional systems that provide the head of state with a fixed term in 
office (i.e. presidential and semi-presidential systems) – a more relevant sample for our purposes 
and the one used throughout the remainder of this article – the share of systems with executive 
term limits is over sixty percent.70  Another ten percent of fixed-term constitutions explicitly 
state that there are no term limits, leaving roughly thirty percent that are silent on the subject. For 
most of the last group I infer that there is no limit, although certainly some such limits may be 
imposed by ordinary law or unwritten custom (e.g. as many assert existed in the United States 
until the passage of the 22nd amendment).71   
Executive term limits come in several varieties. Historically, the most common species 
(twenty-seven percent of all fixed-term constitutions) allows multiple terms, but not in 
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succession, an approach that institutionalizes some alternation in power.72 The United States 
model, in which only two terms are permitted (as of 1951), is also found with some frequency 
(twenty percent).73  In addition, some eight percent of constitutions combine these two models, 
so that two successive terms are permitted, after which the candidate must sit out at least one 
term before returning. Some Latin American constitutions have a prohibition on consecutive 
terms combined with a specification of the number of terms the executive must remain out of 
office. For example, the constitutions of Ecuador 1830 and 1897, Panama 1956 and 1994, 
Uruguay 1918, and Venezuela 1961 require two terms to elapse before the executive can be 
reelected.   Limitations of the executive to a single term, such as the provision at issue in 
Honduras’ constitutional crisis this summer or Mexico’s sexenio, are relatively rare.74 
Historically, only eighteen constitutions (or three percent of fixed-term constitutions) have 
included such a provision. 
More obscure variants exist. Some constitutions specify an exceptional provision for a 
particular person holding the executive post as well as a more general provision to apply to 
subsequent office-holders. For example, the French constitution of 1852 specifies that “The 
government of the French Republic is confided for ten years to Prince Louis-Napoleon 
Bonaparte, now President of the Republic” (Article 2). The Constitution of Yugoslavia of 1963 
specified a general four-year term for a president but provides unlimited tenure for Josip Broz-
Tito, who served in that office until his death in 1980.  This tendency towards personalization is 
not relegated to the dustbins of history.  As of September 2009, reports suggested that leaders in 
Kazakhstan plan to introduce a law that will name long-time leader Nursultan Nazarbeyev as 
“President for Life.”75  A more reasonable attempt to deal with a short-term political need was 
the Lebanese constitutional amendment of 1995, which included a one-time three-year extension 
of the term of the sitting president.76 
Liberia’s 1847 Constitution, as amended to 1943,77 is a very interesting case in which a 
second eight-year term is prohibited but a shortened second term is allowed:  
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The Supreme Executive Power shall be vested in a President who shall be elected 
by the people, and shall hold his office for a term of eight years. No President 
may be elected for two consecutive terms of eight years, but should a majority of 
the ballots cast at a second or any other succeeding election by all of the electors 
voting thereat elect him, his second or any other succeeding term of office shall 
be for four years.78  
 
Figure 1 provides a historical sense of the distribution of executive term limits.  The 
majority of fixed-term constitutions have always had term limits. In the post World War II era, 
however, we observe a drop in their popularity, mostly due to an influx of non-Latin American 
constitutions to the population. Since the third wave of democratization, executive term limits 
have come back into fashion and are now as popular as ever.  While term limits retain great 
popularity, constitutions now provide executives with a more generous period to govern than did 
early constitutions.  Prior to World War II, few countries with limits allowed their heads of state 
to serve more than one consecutive term.  Since World War II, most countries with term limits 
have settled on two terms as the appropriate threshold, with roughly half of those allowing a 
return to office following a sitting-out period and the other half not allowing any return. 
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Figure 1  Percent of Countries with Executive Term Limits, by Type of Limit 
Universe: Constitutional systems with fixed-term heads of state, since 1850 
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Figure 2 Mean Tenure and Mean Permitted Tenure79 over Time 
Universe: All leaders with a limited term, since 1875 
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Not only is the number of permitted terms on the rise, but so too is the length of terms. 
The most common term lengths for heads of state are four, five, and six years – eighty-four 
percent of constitutions specify one of these term lengths. The prevalence of four-year terms has 
been on the decline since early 1900s. In 1900, sixty percent of constitutions that had a specified 
term length for the head of state provided for a four-year term. By 2000, however, that number 
had decreased to eighteen percent.  This drop may be yet another indicator of the decline of 
popularity of the U.S. constitutional model.80 The share of constitutions granting a five-year 
term, on the other hand, has increased dramatically since 1930s from almost none to about sixty 
percent of those constitutions with a specified term.  
The combination of longer terms and an increase in the number of permitted terms has 
stretched considerably the maximum time heads of state are constitutionally allowed to hold 
office; indeed, the average permitted tenure has doubled since 1875.  As Figure 2 shows, the 
average maximum tenure for executives has increased from just over four years in 1875 to nearly 
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eight years in 2006.  For much of this time period, the observed tenure of executives has also 
increased.  Recent years, however, have witnessed a drop in actual time served. 
 
Figure 3  Percent of Countries with Executive Term Limits, by Region  
Universe: Constitutional systems with fixed-term heads of state, since 1850 
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There is an interesting regional pattern to these data (Figure 3). In Latin America, a 
region that has been universally presidentialist since state formation, nearly all constitutions 
through the turn of the twentieth century and well over ninety percent of constitutions through 
World War II contained executive term limits. In the post-war era, however, the proportion of 
cases in Latin America with limits has dropped. Among constitutions currently in force in Latin 
America, only eighty-five percent contain executive term limits, down from ninety-five 
immediately after World War II. On the other hand, constitutions in the rest of the world have 
gone the other direction. While only forty-seven percent of constitutions outside of Latin 
America provided for term limits in 1950, seventy-three percent now do. With respect to term 
limits at least, Latin America is starting to look more like the rest of the world at the same time 
the rest of the world becomes more like Latin America. 
Upon closer inspection, the data also suggest distinctive regional and temporal styles with 
respect to the type of limits. While one-term limits are relatively rare in the modern era, they are 
nearly all found in Latin America (with most such cases allowing non-successive terms). In the 
post-Soviet and Sub-Saharan African countries, on the other hand, two-term limits are more 
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popular, and while the post-soviet countries are split on non-successive terms, the Sub-Saharan 
African countries tend to explicitly prohibit such a return by the executive. 
Overall, the data suggest that term limits are an almost universal and enduring part of 
presidential democracy.  They are prominent not only in Latin America – a region where their 
usage has eroded in recent years – but also in other regions where presidentialism and 
(especially) semi-presidentialism have become fashionable.  It does appear, however, that 
restrictions on executives have softened over the years.  Leaders are permitted to stay twice as 
long as they used to be.  Still, the cases cited at the outset of this article suggested that even these 
longer limits may not be enough to contain executive ambition.  I turn now to an analysis of 
these sorts of evasions. 
 
III. HOW OFTEN ARE TERM LIMITS HONORED? 
 
A crucial question for the study of comparative constitutions is under what conditions 
their provisions are observed. We know, of course, that in many times and places, constitutions 
do not provide any effective constraint on power-holders, while in other instances they seem to 
be effective.81  Term limit provisions provide one lens through which to analyze this issue.  Are 
term limits mere parchment barriers, to be set aside whenever an ambitious executive wishes to 
stay in office? Or do they form real constraints that are observed in practice?  This section 
tackles these questions.  
 
A. Understay, Punctual Exit, and Overstay 
 
Conceptually, executives subject to a fixed term can (1) leave office early (understay), 
(2) serve through their maximum tenure and leave punctually, or (3) overstay,  defined as staying 
longer than the maximum term as it stood when one originally came to office. The  focus here is 
on the latter two categories. We can classify leaders into one of the three categories by 
comparing de jure constitutional information on term limits with the period of time that leaders 
actually served. The former can be assessed with data from written constitutions, combining 
information on both the number and the length of terms that leaders are permitted. These two 
elements combine to produce a measure of the maximum allowed tenure. Figure 4 describes the 
distribution of this measure, whose mean of roughly eight for this sample corresponds to the U.S. 
model of two terms of four years and out. The modal value of ten, likewise, corresponds to the 
increasingly popular formula of two terms of five years.   
This measure is fairly easy to compare with the career of leaders who served consecutive 
terms.  Of course, any such comparison depends upon good information on the tenure of world 
leaders and for that I employ a very useful set of data from the Archigos Project,82 which records 
the date which leaders took and left office and by what means they left, for leaders across the 
world since 1875. The analysis of the two sets of data thus begins in 1875, even though we have 
data on constitutional provisions dating to 1789.  The sample includes 644 heads of state subject 
to limits, of whom 45 percent (292) understayed, 44 percent (281) served their maximum tenure 
and then stepped down, and 11 percent (71) overstayed.   
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 Nathan Brown, CONSTITUTIONS IN A NON-CONSTITUTIONAL WORLD (2001). 
82
 Goemans, Gleditsch & Chiozza, supra note 12. 
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Figure 4  Maximum Tenure for Heads of State (Combines Term Length and Term Limits) 
Universe: Constitutional systems with fixed-term heads of state, since 1789 
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For the purposes of this article, we are primarily interested in the last two groups of 
executives, but since the plurality of leaders understay, a brief look at this group seems 
warranted.  Leaders might leave early for a number of reasons.  Table 1, which draws on the 
reasons for exit as coded by Goemans et al., sheds some light here.  Most understayers (fifty-one 
percent) are removed from office through “regular means,” which for the executives in this set 
means regularly scheduled elections (although these elections may not be “free and fair”).  
Another twelve percent either died of natural causes or retired citing health reasons.  Thus, over 
sixty percent of executives who did not serve their maximum tenure left through “regular” 
means, leaving the formal constitution intact.83 On the other hand, a non-trivial number of 
understaying executives (32.3%) were forced from office by some extra-constitutional leadership 
change, such as a military coup.  The third row of Table 1 concerns those who serve their 
maximum time in office and then leave punctually.  Roughly ninety percent of these executives 
leave office through “regular” means.  Thus, it appears that those who leave office early are 
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 Some four percent of understaying executives are still in office.  The fate of these executives is 
undecided.  They may turn out to be understayers.  They may also serve their maximum tenure or beyond. 
Executive Term Limits 
 
25 
unlikely to leave through constitutionally prescribed procedures, while those who leave “on 
time” do. 
Some subset of those leaders that understay or leave on time would likely have preferred 
to remain in office. Another subset probably tried to remain in office, despite limits, but without 
success. (Indeed, Honduran President Zelaya “understayed” only because he failed in his attempt 
to overstay.) At this stage, we cannot estimate the population in these groups precisely. 
Unrealized attempts to extend power do not reveal themselves easily, at least in the large sample 
we consider here. We can, however, say something about the degree and kind of overstays.  
 
Table 1 – Punctuality and Mode of Exit 
Universe: Fixed-term executives, since 1875 
  Mode of Exit  
Punctuality of Exit  Still in 
Office 
Regular 
Means 
Died in 
Office 
Retired Irregular 
Means 
N 
[Not Subject to Term Limits]  6 
(2.9%) 
153 
(74.3%) 
10 
(4.9%) 
2 
(1.0%) 
35 
(17.0%) 
206 
Understay  11 
(3.8%) 
150 
(51.4%) 
26 
(8.9%) 
11 
(3.8%) 
94 
(32.3%) 
292 
Exit at maximum permitted 
tenure 
 22 
(7.8%) 
228 
(81.1%) 
4 
(1.4%) 
6 
(2.1%) 
21 
(7.5%) 
281 
Overstay  18 
(25.4%) 
26 
(36.6%) 
7 
(9.9%) 
0 
(0.0%) 
20 
(29.0%) 
71 
Means of Overstay        
Amendment  14 
(48.3%) 
8 
(27.6%) 
2 
(6.9%) 
0 
(0.0%) 
5 
(17.2%) 
29 
Replacement  2 
(7.4%) 
13 
(48.2%) 
2 
(7.4%) 
0 
(0.0%) 
10 
(37.0%) 
27 
Coup/Emergency/Suspension  1 
(20.0%) 
1 
(20.0%) 
1 
(20.0%) 
0 
(0.0%) 
2 
(40.0%) 
5 
Disregarded/Not Specified  2 
(22.2%) 
4 
(33.3%) 
1 
(11.1%) 
0 
(0.0%) 
3 
(33.3%) 
9 
ALL  57 
(6.7%) 
557 
(65.5%) 
47 
(5.5%) 
19 
(2.2%) 
170 
(20.0%) 
850 
 
Overall, overstayers do not constitute a significant segment of the population of leaders 
(eleven percent).  Yet, if we restrict the analysis to those executives who actually had the 
opportunity to overstay (i.e. omitting understayers), the overstayers are a significant group.  This 
sort of restriction makes sense since an executive’s age, popularity, and other factors restrict 
opportunities for overstaying.  So, of those leaders who served at least their maximum tenure, 
more than twenty percent stayed longer than allowed.  Overstayers managed this through various 
means. As we have noted, sometimes the executive may engineer a constitutional amendment or 
judicial interpretation to ensure continued tenure in office, either by extending the current term 
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or by removing prohibitions on re-election.84  If an amendment is unavailable, the executive may 
formally suspend the constitution’s operation, perhaps through the use of emergency powers, or 
simply ignore the constitution. In some cases, the executive may commission the writing of a 
new constitution more amenable to longer terms. Such re-writing can extend the term of the 
executive, remove the limit on the number of terms the executive is able to serve, or simply reset 
the clock, so to speak, by reducing the number of full terms the executive served under the in 
force constitution. Thus, both overstay and understay can come in both constitutional and extra-
constitutional varieties.  Some recent work suggests that extra-constitutional modes of term limit 
transgression are becoming less common.85 
To examine this claim in more detail, I analyze every instance of potential executive 
overstay, meaning all leaders who stayed until at least the expiration of their term.  This more 
careful examination resulted in a smaller number of overstays than observed in the Archigos 
data.  Out of 352 potential overstayers,  89 (25.3%) attempted stay beyond their term.86  Of these, 
79.8% (n=71) were successful.  This means that in 20.2% of cases (71 of 352), term limits were 
not effective predictors of actual term served.  The cases of unsuccessful attempts to overstay 
might also be considered constitutional failures from an ideal of self-enforcement, but from 
another perspective they reflect the effective (albeit active) enforcement of the constitution.87   
Of the 71 cases in which executives successfully overstayed, 29 involved constitutional 
amendment and hence are relatively unproblematic from a normative point of view.88  In another 
27 cases the constitution was replaced, and in 5 cases the constitution was suspended or set aside.  
The remaining 10 cases indicate the constitution simply being disregarded or are cases for which 
the mechanism of overstay is unclear, at least according to the historical sources we consulted.  
Setting aside those who overstayed through constitutional amendment, we can say that roughly 
42 cases of overstay (11.9% of all potential overstayers) resulted in a severe break to the 
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 As noted above, the latter is exactly what occurred in Nicaragua in October 2009.  Our data cannot 
capture such reinterpretations of term limits. 
85
 Posner & Young, supra note 7. 
86
 The most common method of seeking an overstay was a constitutional amendment (n=40) followed by 
constitutional replacement (n=29). Constitutional suspension or coup occurred in 5 cases, and in 15 cases 
the constitution was simply disregarded or the mechanism of overstay was unclear. 
87
 Our data suggests that many of these are failed amendments.  Attempts to overstay through amendment 
succeed in 72.5% of attempts, while attempts through replacement and suspension were successful in 
more than 95% of cases. 
88
 From an empirical standpoint, overstay through amendment also seems relatively unproblematic.  
Executives who extend their maximum tenure through the amendment process typically only stay in 
office for an extra four years, about one term.  However, executives that extend their maximum tenure 
through replacement or suspension of the constitution typically stay in office for 6 or 10 extra years, 
respectively.  These numbers would likely be even higher if such a large number of executives who 
overstay via replacement or suspension were not removed through irregular means (see Table 1).  Of 
course, there are exceptions to this general rule, like Zine El Abidine Ben Ali of Tunisia who has served 
as president since 1987 via an amendment in 2002 that abolished term limits in the country, but in 
general, those who extend their term limits through constitutional amendment overstay fewer years than 
those who use other means.  Moreover, as discussed below, the consequences of overstay tend to be less 
severe when overstay is achieved through amendment. 
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constitutional order (and another 18 attempts to overstay were unsuccessful). Whether this is 
considered a large or small number depends on a view of the proverbial glass being half full or 
half empty, but it is at least arguable  that a figure of 1 in 8 represents a serious level of risk for 
the constitutional order, even if we can celebrate the fact that the constitution “works” in the 
other seven cases. 
Even these numbers may overstate the incidence of punctual exit.  Sometimes an 
executive can leave on time yet violate the spirit of term limits. Vladimir Putin’s amendments 
that created a more powerful prime ministerial office, and thus provided a “golden parachute” for 
the ex-President, is one example. Dominican dictator Rafael Trujillo cited American practice of 
limiting the presidency to two terms when in 1938 he stated that he refused to run, despite what 
he interpreted to be the wishes of his people.89 Trujillo proceeded to step down in favor of his 
Vice-President. But, after President Roosevelt ran for a third term in 1942, Trujillo followed suit 
and reassumed the presidency for two more terms, stepping down again in favor of his brother 
Hector in 1952.90 The analysis of evasions of term limits in this article does not fully capture 
these “false negative” instances of overstay.91   
Figures 5 and 6 illustrate patterns of term limit evasion both over time and across space.  
Both figures report the number of evasions among potential overstayers (that is, the number of 
leaders who were supposed to leave in a given year) as well as a smoothed (lowess) line that 
indicates the probability of overstay.  These figures provide a sense of the incidence of term limit 
evasion over time.  Figure 5, which plots the incidence for all potential overstayers, reminds us 
that overstaying term limits is a time-honored practice. The incidence of term limit evasion has 
remained fairly stable since 1875, albeit with an apparent increase in the last ten years.  Although 
term limit evasion is not a modern problem, it appear to be growing more acute.  
Figure 6 describes the offenders by region and over time. Latin America clearly has the 
longest history of evasion, as it does the longest history of presidential democracy.  We count 
forty-two instances of tenure evasion in Latin America since 1875. But the overall rate of 
overstay is lower in Latin America than in other regions: only 15.6% of potential overstayers 
actually overstay.  If anything, term limit evasion is on the decline in Latin America relative to  
the historical pattern.92   
                                                           
89
 Jonathan Hartlyn, THE STRUGGLE FOR DEMOCRATIC POLITICS IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC (1998). 
90
 Id.  Perhaps anticipating such manipulation, some Latin American constitutions forbid relatives from 
succeeding the president.  See Constitución Política de la República de Nicaragua [Cn.] [Constitution] art. 
171 (1948). 
91
 Another type of term evasion involves those who violate the limit on the number of non-consecutive 
terms.  As noted in Figure 1, constitutions increasingly eliminate executives’ ability to serve non-
consecutive terms.  With these new limits on executive tenure comes the possibility that an executive may 
run after an intermediary term when they are constitutionally barred from office.  The only such evasion 
we were able to identify was by Rafael Nunez of Colombia.  Nunez was president from August 11, 1884 
to April 1, 1886, and despite a restriction in the 1863 constitution that a full two-year term must elapse 
before a president is eligible to serve again, he took office again on June 4, 1887.  However, it is unclear 
whether this is an overstay because Nunez’s two terms were served under two different constitutions.  For 
the sake of inclusiveness, we count it as one. 
92
 It should be noted, however, that this analysis does not incorporate the most recent round of evasions in 
Latin America that have occurred since 2006.   
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Our primary concern in this section has been to estimate the overall risk of term limit 
evasion.  While tolerance for term-limit evasion will no doubt vary, an overall risk of 11.9% of 
constitutional rupture (overstay without following amendment procedures) seems somewhat high 
and worthy of further analysis.  The upward trend in term limit evasion also invites a more 
thorough evaluation of the causes and consequences of evasion.  The next two sections take on 
these tasks. 
 
Figure 5  Probability of Maximum Tenure Evasions by Executives by Year 
Universe: Fixed-term executives who served their maximum tenure, since 1875 
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 Figure 6  Probability of Maximum Tenure Evasions by Executives by Year and Region 
Universe: Fixed-term executives who served their maximum tenure, since 1875 
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B. Determinants of Overstay 
 
This section explores the determinants of overstay more rigorously in a multivariate 
analysis.   The dependent variable in this analysis is the odds of overstay, and the sample is all 
potential overstayers.  The analysis includes several variables that might be thought to predict 
overstay.  I ask whether age of the leader matters, with the hypothesis being that older leaders 
will be more likely to overstay under the assumption that they are less likely to assume another 
powerful position in their working life. (I also include a squared term to test whether this effect is 
non-linear due to the debilitating effects of aging.)  I examine the leader’s profession, 
categorized as lawyer, military, or other.  The former two categories were most frequent, and the 
expectation is that military leaders would be more likely to violate on the grounds that they have 
more opportunity because of military support.  Lawyers  might be less likely to overstay, at least 
if they have a professional habit of law-abidingness.93 Other leader characteristics in the analysis 
include the number of terms the leader has previously served and whether the leader himself 
came into power through irregular means such as a coup. 
Besides characteristics of the leader we examine the type of term limit at issue to see 
whether single or multiple terms increase the propensity of violation.  We also look at country 
characteristics such as the number of previous overstays in the country’s history, the democratic 
health of the country at the time the leader took office (using the widely used Polity database),94 
the age of both the regime (i.e., democratic or authoritarian) and that of the constitution,95 and 
the number of executives to account for differences in executive-legislative relations.  The 
hypothesis is that older constitutions are more likely to be enforced and thus discourage violators 
of term limits.96  Finally, the model includes dummy variables for different regions of the world 
and the decade in which the potential overstay occurs.  To estimate the model I employ logistic 
regression, which is appropriate for binary dependent variables. 
                                                           
93
 We surmise that lawyers who do overstay would be more likely to do so through formally constitutional 
means such as amendment.   
94
 Polity IV Database: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions 1800-2008, available at 
http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm (last checked February 22, 2010). 
95
 One might suspect that the age of the constitution will be highly correlated with the age of the regime.  
In the sample we analyze, the correlation is moderately high (R = 0.54) but not sufficiently high to 
suggest that multicollinearity will be a problem. 
96
 See Elkins, Ginsburg and Melkins, supra note 60, at 111. 
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Figure 7  Logistic Regression Model Predicting Successful Term Limit Violations97 
Universe: Fixed-term executives who served their maximum tenure, since 1875 (n = 350; 87% 
classified correctly) 
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 The figure contains results from a logistic regression model with coefficient estimates indicated by the 
markers and 95% confidence interval indicated by the bars.  Positive coefficients indicate that the variable 
is associated with higher levels of term limit evasion, while negative coefficients indicate a lower 
likelihood of evasion. Variables whose 95% confidence interval does not overlap 0 – as indicated by the 
vertical reference line – are considered statistically significant. Regional and decade dummies are omitted 
from the figure.  The full results of this model as well as results from several additional models are 
available from the author. 
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Figure 7 provides the results, which are largely consistent with the hypotheses.  Older leaders are 
indeed more likely to violate term limits (though the negative sign on the  squared term indicates 
that this is not true of very old leaders).  Leaders around ages 30 and 54 exhibit the baseline 
predicted probability of overstay (model baseline = 0.10),98 with leaders in their mid-40’s having 
the highest probability.99  The probability that military leaders will overstay is 0.13 higher than 
that of non-military leaders, but we find no apparent “law-abidingness” effect for lawyers.100  
Leaders who themselves took office through irregular means have a probability of overstaying 
that is 0.26 higher than those who took office through regular means.  Leaders who previously 
served non-consecutive terms are just as likely as leaders who served no previous terms to 
violate. 
The results show that executives who are initially allowed to serve two or more terms 
have a probability of overstaying 0.33 higher than executives who initially face either a single-
term limit or no term limit at all, an interesting finding we discuss below.  The presence of both 
democracy and older constitutions tends to decrease the propensity to overstay.  This suggests 
that constitutional enforcement plays a role in deterring violations.101   The coefficient for the 
number of executives is close to statistically significant, indicating that the probability that 
executives in presidential systems will overstay is 0.09 lower than that for executives in semi-
presidential systems.  On the other hand, a number of country-level variables have no significant 
effect on overstay, including the prohibition of non-consecutive terms, a history of previous 
overstays, and the age of the regime.  We also find no regional or temporal effects (except for an 
apparent dearth of overstays in the 1890s).  These null findings suggest a certain universality of 
term limit evasion in that the attributes of violators do not correspond to a particular political, 
geographic, or historical profile.   
One might suspect that the mechanisms affecting leaders’ desires and ability to overstay 
might vary by regime-type.  To test this possibility, I re-ran the logistic regression models in 
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 This baseline is calculated while holding the values of all independent variables (except age) at their 
means.  All of the marginal effects discussed in this paragraph and the next are in reference to this 
baseline and are also calculated while holding all other independent variables at their means.  For 
example, when we state that leaders in their mid-40’s have a 0.07 higher probability of overstay than 
leaders aged 30 or 54, this means that leaders in their mid-40’s have a 0.17 probability versus a 0.10 
probability for leaders aged 30 or 54. 
99
 0.07 higher than the baseline. 
100
 We do not yet examine whether those lawyers who do overstay do so through more legalistic means.  
Analyzing the means of overstay in a multivariate framework would require the use of a multinomial logit 
or probit model, and our data do not satisfy the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) assumption 
required by such a model.  A two-way analysis of this relationship, though, suggests that lawyers who 
overstay are no more likely to use amendment than executives with other professions. 
101
 Barry R. Weingast, The Political Foundations of Democracy and the Rule of Law, 91 AM. POL. SCI. 
REV. 245 (1997). 
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Figure 7 on samples restricted to autocracies or democracies, measured at the first year of the 
leader’s term.102  Interestingly, the variables that predict overstay in democracies are different 
from those that do so in autocracies.  In democracies, only the military background of the leader 
and the age of the constitution remain statistically significant.  In autocracies, many of the same 
variables that were statistically significant in the full sample remain so, including age, military 
background, form of entry, number of terms allowed, and Polity score.103   
To summarize, several interesting findings emerge from the analysis of the determinants 
of term limit violation.  The results demonstrate that former military leaders are significantly 
more likely to overstay, regardless of the kind of regime in place when they take office.  In 
autocratic regimes, the term limit faced by the executive influences their decision to overstay, as 
leaders are much more likely to overstay if they are initially allowed two or more terms than if 
they face no term limit or are only allowed 1 term.  Perhaps leaders develop a taste for power in 
their second term, or have accumulated sufficient power to be able to manipulate the tools of 
government to allow an overstay.  The results also show that executives elected in democracies 
are less likely to violate constitutions.  This is consistent with the general idea that constitutions 
“matter” more in democracies than in autocracies. 
 
C. Consequences of Overstay 
 
Even if overstay through constitutional rupture occurs with some frequency (one in eight 
cases), it does not follow that these actions result in constitutional crisis, as opposed to 
something closer to a consensual shift in constitutional norms.  A more thorough investigation of 
the consequences of term limit violations is required.  The remainder of this section offers some 
suggestive evidence. 
To evaluate the effect of term limits on crisis propensity, we need some sense of the 
baseline incidence of crisis.  Unfortunately, there is no generally accepted indicator of 
constitutional crisis of the type we are considering.  One way to get at the question is to examine 
the percentage of constitutional deaths (instances in which a constitution is suspended or 
replaced, as opposed to merely amended) that result from the quest for overstay.104  By this 
metric, term limits pose a moderate threat to constitutions.  32 constitutions (less than 5% of all 
constitutions) have met their demise as a result of term limit violations.  When compared to some 
important environmental threats to constitutions (e.g. war, coups, and regime change, etc.), term 
limit violations are not associated with a large number of deaths.105   
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 These models are on file with the authors. For this analysis, we classify country-years as democratic if 
their Polity score is 3 or greater and as autocratic of their score is less than 3.  This is a relatively low 
threshold compared to the one traditionally used in the literature, because we wanted to be sure to include 
new and marginal democracies in the sample. 
103
 The only differences between the autocracy-only model and the full-sample model are that, in the 
autocracy-only model, the confidence intervals of the number of executives variable shrink and the age of 
the constitution is no longer statistically significant.  Thus, the only variable that predicts overstay 
regardless of regime-type is military background.  
104
 See ELKINS, GINSBURG & MELTON, supra note 60, at 55-59 (amendments typically do not change the 
fundamental constitutional structure.) 
105
 See generally ELKINS, GINSBURG & MELTON, supra note 60. 
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Examining formal constitutional changes alone, however, does not fully capture the 
extent that the conflict over term limit violations interrupts normal politics.  Perhaps a better 
measure of constitutional crisis is the occurrence of political conflict.  To operationalize political 
conflict, I use Bank’s data on assassinations, strikes, guerilla warfare, government crises, purges, 
riots, and revolutions. 106  Table 2 captures the average number of years of political conflict for 
all years of rule by category of leader (with respect to the punctuality of their exit).  One 
observes that overstayers experience fewer years of conflict than do non-overstayers. This is 
somewhat understandable, in that an overstayer will either be sufficiently popular to minimize 
political conflict or sufficiently strong to repress it.  A similar trend is apparent even if we 
account for crisis during the last two years of executives’ terms, that during the two years prior to 
a term limit violation, and even for the means of overstay.  Furthermore, the level of political 
conflict is relatively low in systems in which there are no term limits at all.  It is hard to sort out 
the story here because of selection effects, but the overall conclusion seems inconsistent with the 
conjecture that term limits induce higher levels of political conflict through overstays. Alexander 
Hamilton, it seems, was wrong about this point. 
 
Table 2 – Average Number of Years with a Conflict by Overstay Status107 
Universe: Fixed-term executives, since 1875 
 All Years of 
Term 
Last 2 Years of  
Actual Tenure 
Last 2 Years of  
Permitted Tenure 
N 
No Term Limits 2.4 (54.2%) 0.8 - 97 
Understay 1.7 (75.4%) 1.1 - 209 
Exit at maximum permitted tenure 3.3 (60.0%) 1.1 1.1 202 
Overstayer 6.5 (46.5%) 0.6 0.7 54 
By Means of     
Amendment 4.7 (44.0%) 0.4 0.4 35 
Replacement 7.6 (58.4%) 1.1 0.9 21 
Coup/Emergency/Suspension 5.3 (20.1%) 0.5 0.5 4 
Disregarded/Not Specified 9 (58.9%) 0.8 0.4 9 
All 2.9 (63.4%) 1.0 1.0 562 
 
 
                                                           
106
 Cross National Time Series Data Archive, http://www.databanks.sitehosting.net/Default.htm (last 
visited Feb. 20, 2010) 
107The percent of country-years leaders experienced conflict during their terms is the variable analyzed in 
the table.  A country-year is coded as experiencing a conflict if there were any of the following events in 
that year:  assassinations, strikes, guerilla warfare, government crises, purges, riots, or revolutions.  The 
data for this variable are from Banks (2001) and spans from 1919-2003.  We prefer this measure to 
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Despite little evidence that term limit violations induce constitutional crisis, term limit 
violations may have other negative effects.  One potential consequence is an increased likelihood 
of future overstays.  But, perhaps surprisingly, a national history of overstay does not seem to 
predict future occurrences. Executives in a country with no history of overstay are more likely to 
violate than are those in a country with at least one previous occurrence (24.9% vs. 15.1%).  And 
the probability generally declines with the number of previous overstays in the country (Table 
3).108  Thus, it appears that overstay does not breed future overstay.  
 
Table 3 – Analysis of Overstay Recurrence 
Universe: Fixed-term executives who served their maximum tenure, since 1875 
Previous Overstays Number of 
Executives 
Number of 
Overstays 
Percentage of 
Overstays 
None 165 41 24.9% 
At Least 1 185 28 15.1% 
Number of Previous Overstays    
1 57 16 28.1% 
2 75 8 10.7% 
3 42 2 4.8% 
4 1 1 100% 
5 10 1 10.0% 
Means of Previous Overstay    
Amendment 75 7 9.3% 
Replacement 64 14 21.9% 
Coup/Emergency/Suspension 5 1 20.0% 
Disregarded/Not Specified 41 6 24.0% 
ALL 350 69 19.7% 
 
 Another potential consequence of term limit violations is that they might degrade 
democracy.  Table 4 assesses this possibility.  Democracy in these figures is measured by the 
widely used Polity index.109  The results demonstrate that levels of democracy do not tend to 
change much across leaders’ tenures, regardless of whether the leader is an overstayer or not, and 
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this trend is the same regardless of initial regime-type or the means of overstay.  In fact, if there 
is any trend, it is that in initially democratic regimes, democracy increases slightly during the 
tenure of overstayers.  This is especially surprising since the removal of term limits might itself 
penalize a country’s score on democracy, based on the conceptualization employed by Polity.  
 
Table 4 – Mean Level of Democracy (as Measured by Polity) by Initial Regime-Type and 
Overstay Status110 
Universe: Fixed-term executives, since 1875 
Autocracies (Polity < 3) Democracies (Polity ≥ 3)  N 
Start 
Year 
Violation 
Year 
End 
Year 
Start 
Year 
Violation 
Year 
End 
Year 
No Term Limits 225 -4.8 (2.80) - 
-4.5 
(2.80) 
8.7 
(1.85) - 
8.7 
(1.77) 
Understay 304 -3.0 (3.02) - 
-3.0 
(2.98) 
6.9 
(2.05) - 
7.0 
(2.00) 
Exit at maximum 
permitted tenure 279 
-2.5 
(3.16) - 
-2.3 
(3.19) 
7.3 
(2.28) - 
7.3 
(2.31) 
Overstay 69 -4.4 (3.37) 
-4.6 
(3.44) 
-4.4 
(3.49) 
6.6 
(1.76) 
7.1 
(1.36) 
7 
(1.34) 
By Means of        
Amendment 38 -5.0 (3.38) 
-4.7 
(3.68) 
-4.4 
(4.05) 
7.2 
(1.57) 
7.75 
(1.71) 
7.8 
(1.72) 
Replacement 29 -4.2 (2.95) 
-5.1 
(3.33) 
-4.6 
(3.34) 
6.0 
(2.00) 
6 
(-) 
8 
(-) 
Coup/Emergency/ 
Suspension 5 
-5.0 
(4.24) 
-5 
(4.24) 
-4.8 
(3.95) 
5.0 
(-) - - 
Disregarded/Not 
Specified 15 
-2.3 
(3.80) 
-4.2 
(4.21) 
-3.1 
(3.98) 
6.0 
(1.41) 
6.5 
(0.71) 
6 
(1.00) 
ALL 877 -3.3 (3.18) - 
-3.2 
(3.18) 
7.7 
(2.19) - 
7.8 
(2.15) 
 
 Another way to get at the consequences of term limit evasion is to trace particular case 
histories.  The appendix lists every violator of term limits, sorted by whether the country was a 
democracy or autocracy at the time the leader took office.  Of the democratically elected leaders 
who overstayed in recent years, several did so through amendment and thus may fit the model of 
the popular leader who works around the default rule to remain in office.  Carlos Menem in 
Argentina and Fernando Cardoso in Brazil revised their constitutions to allow a second term, and 
both turned over the office to opposition parties after their second terms were over (though 
Menem tried to stay on before his attempt was ruled unconstitutional). Alexander Lukashenko in 
Belarus, on the other hand, used amendment to consolidate power and moved his country from 
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the ranks of democracies to a “competitive authoritarian” regime.  Others who pursued this 
strategy either replaced the constitution wholesale (Alberto Fujimori, Ferdinand Marcos) or 
simply suspended it after failing to secure amendment (Tandja Mamadou in Niger). 
 The 19th century cases are also mixed. For example, Costa Rica enacted a single four-
year term limit with its 1871 constitution. President Tomás Miguel Guardia Gutiérrez, who had 
been part of a coup ousting the previous president, overstayed several months, then ceded power 
to a puppet leader briefly before being re-elected to continue his overstay until his own death. 
Term limits were then observed for some time.  In 1889, President Ramón Bernardo Soto Alfaro 
attempted to overstay after holding the “first honest election” in the country—but mass protests 
prevented him from succeeding.111 The regime of his successor Jose Joaquin Rodriguez marked a 
turning point for democracy.112 Thereafter, only one leader has overstayed (Castro in 1898) and 
has done so through constitutional amendment.113  The Costa Rican story appears to be one in 
which attempted evasion leads to mass enforcement, ultimately leading to stable democracy. 
 Contrast Venezuela, the country in the sample with the largest number of overstays (six).  
Five of these occurred in the forty years prior to 1913 (see Appendix), a period of successive 
military strongmen, who sometimes overstayed while other times governed through puppet 
leaders that would leave office on time. There was no effective enforcement of term limits, and 
their application seemed to depend on the whim of the ruler. After democracy was re-established 
in 1959, term limits were regularly observed.  Hugo Chavez, however, initiated constitutional 
reform after his initial election in 1999, and then in 2007 attempted to amend the new 
constitution to remove term limits.  His first referendum attempt failed narrowly, but Chavez was 
able to hold another referendum in 2009 which succeeded.  Chavez seems to represent a return to 
an earlier, less democratic tradition in Venezuela. 
 Ferdinand Marcos of the Philippines exemplifies an executive who suspended democracy 
to remain in office.  The Philippines was considered a democracy at the time of his initial 
election in 1965.  The presidential term was four years, with a limit of eight consecutive years in 
office.114  In 1969, Marcos won an unprecedented second term, but thereafter became 
increasingly dictatorial and developed a cult of personality.  With rising insecurity and a 
communist uprising, Marcos declared martial law in 1972, suspending Congress.  He then wrote 
a new constitution that allowed him to remain in power, and his dictatorship continued until the 
“People Power” revolution of 1986.  Since the re-establishment of democracy, however, the 
Philippine political system has weathered many attempts to engineer overstay, and has rebuffed 
them all.115 Like Costa Rica, an incident of successful enforcement seems to have facilitated a 
pattern of observance of term limits thereafter. 
 To summarize the main results of the empirical analysis: some form of constitutional 
rupture occurs in roughly twelve percent of cases in which a leader has the potential to overstay, 
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and in eighteen additional cases an executive attempted to overstay.  But overstayers are not 
associated with higher levels of violent political conflict.  Overstay does not breed future 
overstay, nor does it lead to regular decline in levels of democracy.  Furthermore, many 
overstayers seem to leave office after one additional term, particularly those who achieve their 
extended term through constitutional amendment.116  Democracy, on the other hand, seems to 
reduce the prospect of overstay.  In sum, these results suggest that executive overstay is not as 
problematic as recent events suggest. 
 
D. Implications and Discussion 
  
Our analysis also has a number of implications for the question of whether and how 
constitutions “work”.117  From one perspective, term limits seem to be observed with remarkable 
frequency, though it is not clear what a baseline level of enforcement of such provisions ought to 
be. The results suggest that the function of term limits differs across regime type, and that 
broadly speaking, they tend to function better in democracies than dictatorships.  We do not have 
a clear view of the mechanism by which term limits function in democracies: it may operate 
through selection of better agents, through the prospect of enforcement by elites or the people, or 
some other mechanism.  Nevertheless, the effect is strong enough to suggest that constitutional 
provisions seem to be observed more frequently in democracies than in dictatorships.  The gap 
between constitutional provision and practice is narrower. 
Examining each leader who has violated the term limit provisions (see Appendix) reveals 
only 15 violations by leaders who took office in a democratic regime (n=160), with the 
remaining 56 violations occurring in non-democracies (n=192).118  One unanswered question, 
then, is why leaders in autocracies adopt term limits in the first place.  While at the margin term 
limits may provide some constraint, in many cases they provide none.  Furthermore, the 
examples of Putin and Trujillo demonstrate that even apparently-effective term limits can be 
illusory. To speculate, the answer may have something to do with the achievement of internal 
coordination within the regime—a term limit may signal to potential rivals that they may have a 
chance to replace the leader down the road.119  But this question requires further micro-study of 
authoritarian constitutionalism. 
 Even if term limit evasions are sometimes associated with constitutional crises of a 
negative sort, it is necessary to disaggregate democracies and autocracies from a normative 
perspective.  A “crisis” in a dictatorship might lead to democratization and hence be desirable 
from a normative point of view.  For democracies, the reverse presumption holds.  We cannot 
therefore posit a global recommendation for both regime types.   
Despite these limitations of the present analysis, those who are skeptical about term limits 
can point to the Zelaya and Tandja cases to argue that term limits are associated with some risk 
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of constitutional rupture.  From a constitutional design perspective, then, we ought to consider 
institutional alternatives to term limits.  The normative question about whether term limits ought 
to be adopted will depend on the existence of alternative institutional schemes that might 
accomplish the same goals without some of the costs.  The next section considers a number of 
such schemes. 
  
IV. INSTITUTIONAL ALTERNATIVES 
 
Term limits are designed to address real problems with democratic governance, namely 
the incumbency advantage which distorts political choice and may hamper optimal selection of 
representatives.  In the absence of term limits, we might have underperforming representatives 
that stay too long, and so we decide ex ante to precommit to selecting a new agent.  But term 
limits are a blunt instrument to address the incumbency advantage.  Not only is the maximum 
legal length of a limited term unlikely to correspond to a hypothetical optimal term for an 
executive, but this mismatch might induce popular executives to try to adjust the constitution to 
stay in power.  If opposition is significant, the resulting crisis can lead to the death of the 
constitution and even a descent into tyranny. This section considers several alternatives that 
might accomplish some of the desirable goals of term limits without entailing all the costs.  
These include mechanisms to adjust term length; adjust the powers of the presidency through 
“unbundling”; handicap the incumbent; and incentivize the challenger. 
 
A.  Adjusting Term Length 
 
We briefly mentioned the Liberian model of 1943, which featured a halving of the term 
length after the first two terms.  This reduction in term length might provide for greater 
accountability of the incumbent, and in party-based systems might incentivize the political party 
to cultivate successors to the current leader.  A rational political party would rather retain office 
with a new candidate for a longer term, as opposed to retaining office with the incumbent for a 
shorter period. 
Adjusting term length might serve to address the concern with executive tyranny that 
motivates some critics of term limits. More frequent elections would allow the public to 
continuously scrutinize executive performance, enhancing accountability. However, this 
proposal would not directly address the incumbency advantage.  There is nothing in more 
frequent elections per se that would reduce undue advantages an incumbent holds in electoral 
competition.  Indeed, it might give added legitimacy to an incumbent who frequently faces the 
voters. 
A related substitute for term limits would be to promote the institution of recall.  A 
president subject to potential recall from voters is somewhat akin to a prime minister in a 
parliamentary system, in that every period of governance is potentially her last.120 Recall 
provisions are not popular in presidential democracies, for they undermine the advantages of 
having a fixed term in the first place, namely the insulation to pursue policies that are valuable in 
the mid-term.  A feasible hybrid would be to have recall available in later terms only: thus the 
system would have features of a presidential system during the first term and of a parliamentary 
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system in subsequent terms. I know of no system that has tried it, but it seems like a feasible 
option. 
There is, of course, no reason that candidates to office need to stand for symmetrical 
terms.  We might think about term length as a variable that candidates could themselves 
manipulate within constraints.  Suppose, for example, that candidates for a second term to the 
United States presidency could choose to run for (a) a single term of four years or (b) a three 
year term with the possibility of a final third term.  Again, this idea seems to incorporate into a 
presidential system some of the irregular rhythm of elections in a parliamentary system.  There 
would be some coordination costs in aligning terms of the House of Representatives with the 
presidency. But there is nothing sacred about the four year rhythm of the presidential cycle, and 
creative institutional design might exploit variation in term as a device to accomplish some of the 
ends of term limits.  
 
B. Adjusting Powers 
 
Another alternative to term limits might be to reduce formal executive powers as the 
tenure of the office holder goes on.  This could take two forms: unbundling of powers and raising 
constraints.  Either of these options involves the weakening of the executive, and hence reduces 
the incentives to remain in office after the term ends. 
Unbundling refers to the possibility of breaking up executive functions typically 
concentrated in a single office.121  This might involve the adoption of plural executives, such as 
found in many American states with directly elected attorneys general, vice presidents and other 
officials.  In this context case, unbundling might be thought of as shorthand for the idea that the 
formal powers of the executive might be reduced as the number of terms increases.  Such powers 
might be transferred to another executive (for example to the prime minister in a semi-
presidential system) or to another branch of government entirely. Raising constraints refers to the 
idea that one might calibrate constraints on executive decision-making by empowering other 
actors, such as legislatures. 
To illustrate, imagine a presidency with the constitutional powers to appoint officers, to 
issue executive decrees, and to veto legislation, subject to over-ride by 2/3 of the legislature.  An 
unbundling strategy might take the power to issue decrees and transfer it to another executive, 
say the vice-president or member of the legislature.  Raising constraints would make override of 
the executive veto easier, say by reducing the vote threshold to 60%. 
Many term limit adjustments may already proceed under some version of this proposal.  
As mentioned earlier, Carey notes several cases in which an extension of executive term was 
secured through negotiation with Congress.122  For example, Carlos Menem in Argentina was 
able to secure an extension for a third term in exchange for policy concessions to Congress. 
Menem stepped down after the third term.   In cases such as this one, the negotiation may 
involve new implicit or explicit limitations on the institutional power of the presidency, in which 
case de facto unbundling may have taken place. 
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Adjusting powers has several advantages.  By reducing formal power over time, it has the 
effect of mitigating the concern for tyranny that motivates term limits in the first place.  
Reducing powers also serves to disincentivize incumbent candidates from running for office. 
Indeed, a strong political party might insist that the incumbent leave office on time, so as to 
facilitate another candidate who might win and acquire the full range of executive powers. By 
reducing the stakes of the presidency, adjusting powers might facilitate on-time departure and 
build stronger parties. 
To be sure, shedding powers is no panacea. It may introduce a new veto player over key 
policies and so encourage delay and gridlock.  And in any case, a formal reduction in powers 
may not offset the tremendous informal powers that long-serving executives have.  These might 
more than compensate for the lack of formal authority. One might also imagine an executive 
would seek to re-acquire the lost powers through constitutional amendment after gaining office.   
 
C. Handicapping Incumbents and Incentivizing Retirement 
 
Beyond manipulating the design dimensions of term length and constitutional powers, we 
might consider calibrating the electoral process more directly.  One common mechanism is that 
used in many Latin American countries, in which an incumbent seeking re-election must step 
down from office during the period of the electoral campaign.  This device prevents the 
incumbent from using the advantages of office to maintain power.  To be sure, a well-known 
incumbent may still have advantages due to cognitive biases and to media familiarity.  But this 
modest step does serve to handicap incumbents somewhat, and may do little harm. I am  are 
aware of no literature evaluating the institution.123   
A version of this is the notion of caretaker governments.  In some parliamentary systems, 
a new caretaker government is installed when the government loses a vote of no-confidence.  For 
example, in Bangladesh, the caretaker government is an advisory council headed by a former 
Chief Justice, who governs for three months prior to a new election.124 This device is designed to 
prevent self-dealing by a more conventionally political caretaker government.   
If one cannot effectively handicap incumbents, one could consider the inverse: 
incentivizing incumbents to leave office.  Providing for some ex officio constitutional power for 
ex-presidents might induce them to step down.  Consider France, which makes all living ex-
presidents ex officio members of the constitutional court (the Conseil Constitutionell).  
Alternatively, international actors can induce presidents to step down. Ernesto Zedillo, for 
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example, is a professor at Yale University.  The African entrepreneur Mo Ibrahim offers and 
annual prize for the African head of state who steps down, leaving a legacy of good governance 
(though he has had some difficulty finding a recipient in recent years).125 
This approach to institutional design is orthogonal to term limits, in that the two 
mechanisms can be adopted separately or in conjunction.  Its utility will depend on the relative 
sweetness of the inducements relative to the potential gains of remaining in office.  Where the 
latter potential gains are high—such as in non-democracies with resource-rich economies—no 
level of public sector inducement to leave office is likely to be sufficient. Perhaps this explains 
why the well-intentioned Ibrahim prize has gone unclaimed. 
A related concern is the risk of stepping down. Replacement leaders need to be able to 
credibly commit not to extort the wealth and other benefits accrued by leaders, and this is an 
issue that has caused some concern about the International Criminal Court for example.126  
Ensuring that retiring leaders have immunity, asylum possibilities and other such security 
guarantees should help to induce them to leave office after successful overstay. This suggests the 
approach Peru has taken with regard to Alberto Fujimori, extraditing him from Japan and Chile, 
is precisely wrong.127  A subsequent overstayer in Peru will be less likely to step down (though 
arguably less likely to overstay in the first place). 
 
D.  Summary 
 
Each of these three approaches—adjusting term length, adjusting powers, and 
manipulating the incentives of incumbents and challengers—offers some promise for addressing 
problems associated with executive overstay.  Each can operate in conjunction with or as an 
alternative to term limits, serving as either a complements or substitutes to accomplish the same 
goals.  Yet none is an unambiguously better alternative.  If term limits raise problems of 
calibration, so do each of the alternatives.  With term limits, calibration issues arise because we 
never know ex ante what the optimal term length might be.  The identical issues arise in any 
scheme to adjust term length of the incumbent.  Shedding powers also raises calibration issues, 
as we do not know what configuration of powers is sufficient to properly motivate the 
incumbent.  Incentivizing or handicapping incumbents also raises questions of monetization of 
the incumbency advantage and of sufficient inducements to retire.  In short, while each 
institutional alternative has promise, none provides an obviously superior alternative.   
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V. CONCLUSION 
 
Term limits are designed to discourage tyranny and to address real problems of 
incumbency in democratic governance, but have been subject to competing claims by proponents 
and opponents. Some, such as Bolivar, have argued that term limits are necessary to curb 
executive ambition. Others, including Hamilton and other American founders, argued that term 
limits would induce executives to seek to remain in office, and perhaps even generate crises to 
allow themselves to do so. The theoretical debate has proceeded without the benefit of much 
empirical analysis. One of the objectives of this article has been to inform the normative debate 
with data on the frequency of overstay, and to consider some alternative institutions that might 
accomplish some of the ends of term limits without some of the costs in terms of constitutional 
crises. 
Our evidence is not definitive, but on balance suggests that, for democracies at least, 
constitutional crisis induced through term limit violations is relatively rare. Constitutional 
enforcement of term limits appears to operate routinely in democracies, and even in many 
autocracies (such as Mexico before 1994).   Term limits seem to “work” in the vast majority of 
cases, in that those who have the possibility of overstaying do not frequently seek to do so.  Of 
those who do seek to overstay, 20% fail in the attempt, which can also be considered a kind of 
constitutional enforcement of sorts, even if it sometimes coincides with a crisis as defined here.   
Even when term limits are violated, the consequences are not always negative. Our large-
n evidence suggests that overstay does not lead to the denigration of democracy on average.  Of 
the recent overstayers in democracies, some (Menem and Cardoso for example) fit the profile of 
popular leaders who were able to amend around the default rule so as to serve a single extra 
term.  Only a small number of leaders in recent years—Fujimori in Peru, Marcos in the 
Philippines, and Chavez in Venezuela—have completely replaced the constitution to allow 
themselves extra time.  Some such leaders, such as Niger’s Mamadou Tandja, have subsequently 
found themselves replaced through military coup.  
The finding that term limits operate as default rules whose amendment need not always 
lead to future disruption has implications for the study of executive-legislative relations. One of 
the canonical distinctions between presidential and parliamentary systems is that the executive in 
the former is subject to a fixed term, whereas the latter is subject to parliamentary confidence 
and hence not constrained by a fixed term.128 Yet if executives in presidential systems frequently 
overstay (or understay) their term, we might think of presidential systems as de jure rigid, but in 
practice flexible in the number of years an executive serves.  This highlights Professor Albert’s 
recent argument that the two canonical regime types may not, in fact, be so different in actual 
operation.129 
Our consideration of institutional alternatives to term limits includes several new ideas 
not yet identified in the literature, including adjusting term length for incumbents only, reducing 
the powers of executive office with successive terms, or manipulating the incentives of 
incumbents to remain in office.  Each of these alternatives, however, has costs.  Furthermore, 
each alternative relies on the possibility of calibrating a more complex institutional design to 
mitigate incumbency advantages.  The challenges to such calibration are quite real. 
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This suggests that the very simplicity of term limits—easily comprehensible by the 
average citizen—may have something to do with their effectiveness.  Simple and clear rules, it 
seems, can facilitate effective constitutional enforcement.130  Constitutional text provides a focal 
point for enforcement behavior, and such enforcement is likely to be easier when everyone 
understands the rules.  While drawing a line of four or eight years as a maximum term in office 
has elements of arbitrariness, the very clarity of a bright- line rule ensures that the line will, more 
often than not, be observed.  In contrast with Alexander Hamilton’s conjecture, term limits 
restrain rather than promote conflict.  In the matter of constraining executive ambition, then, 
most constitutions seem to work most of the time.131  
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VI.  APPENDIX 
Table A1 – List of Democratic Overstayers (Democracy = Polity>=3) 
Country Year Leader Means of Overstay Overstay 
Year 
Level of 
Democracy 
Age of 
Democracy 
Argentina 1988 Menem Amendment 1995 8 5 
Belarus 
(Byelorussia) 1994 Lukashenko Amendment 2006 7 3 
Brazil 1995 Cardoso Amendment 1998 8 10 
Colombia 1884 Nunez Replacement 1886 8 17 
Colombia 2002 Alvaro Uribe Velez Amendment 2006 7 45 
Costa Rica 1870 Guardia Disregarded/Not Specified 1876 5 29 
Costa Rica 1885 Bernardo Soto Alfaro Disregarded/Not Specified 1886 7 44 
Costa Rica 1894 Rafael Yglesias Castro Amendment 1898 10 4 
Honduras 1933 Carias Andino Replacement 1936 5 7 
Namibia 1990 Nujoma Amendment 2000 6 0 
Niger 1999 Mamadou Coup/Emergency/Suspension 2009 5 0 
Peru 1990 Fujimori Replacement 1995 8 10 
Philippines 1965 Marcos Replacement 1973 5 15 
Uruguay 1931 Terra Replacement 1935 3 27 
Venezuela 1999 Hugo Chavez Replacement 2004 7 30 
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Table A1 – List of Autocratic Overstayers (Autocracy = Polity<3) 
Country Year Leader Means of Overstay 
Overstay 
Year 
Level of 
Democracy 
Age of 
Democracy 
Algeria 1999 Bouteflika Amendment 2009 -3 4 
Angola 1979 Dos Santos Disregarded/Not Specified 2007 -7 4 
Argentina 1946 Peron Amendment 1952 -8 0 
Bolivia 1920 Saavedra De Facto Control 1924 2 40 
Bolivia 1971 Banzer Suarez Disregarded/Not Specified 1975 -7 0 
Brazil 1930 Vargas Replacement 1938 -4 0 
Chad 1990 Deby Amendment 2006 -7 4 
Chile 1973 Pinochet Replacement 1980 -7 0 
Colombia 1904 Reyes Prieto Amendment 1907 -5 0 
Congo, 
Democratic  
Republic Of 
1965 Mobutu Replacement 1969 -9 0 
Ecuador 1895 Aloy Alfaro Delgado Replacement 1896 -1 65 
Ecuador 1906 Aloy Alfaro Delgado Coup/Emergency/Suspension 1906 -3 76 
El Salvador 1871 Gonzalez Replacement 1873 -1 12 
El Salvador 1876 Zaldivar Replacement 1880 -1 17 
El Salvador 1935 Hernandez Martinez Replacement 1939 -9 4 
Eritrea 1993 Afeworki Disregarded/Not Specified 2007 -6 0 
Gabon 1967 Bongo Amendment 2003 -7 7 
Guatemala 1885 Barillas Amendment 1889 2 6 
Guatemala 1898 Estrada-Cabrera Disregarded/Not Specified 1903 2 0 
Guatemala 1931 Ubico Castaneda Amendment 1934 -9 0 
Guinea 1984 Conte Amendment 2001 -7 26 
Haiti 1957 Duvalier, Replacement 1962 -5 7 
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Country Year Leader Means of Overstay 
Overstay 
Year 
Level of 
Democracy 
Age of 
Democracy 
Francois 
Honduras 1963 Lopez Arellano Replacement 1968 -1 27 
Kazakhstan 1991 Nazarbaev Amendment 2005 -3 0 
Lebanon 1943 EL Khoury Amendment 1948 2 0 
Lebanon 1989 Elias Hrawi Amendment 1995 0 0 
Lebanon 1998 Emile Lahoud Amendment 2004  0 
Liberia 1944 Tubman Amendment 1951 -6 60 
Lithuania 1926 Smetona Replacement 1932 0 0 
Mali 1968 Traore Amendment 1987 -7 8 
Nicaragua 1893 Zelaya Amendment 1896 -5 55 
Nicaragua 1911 Adolfo Diaz Disregarded/Not Specified 1914 -3 73 
Nicaragua 1937 Anastasio Somoza Garcia Replacement 1942 -8 1 
Nicaragua 1967 
Anastasio 
Somoza 
Debayle 
Replacement 1972 -8 31 
Panama 1920 
Belisario 
Porras 
Barahona 
Amendment 1920 -3 17 
Paraguay 1880 Caballero Disregarded/Not Specified 1882 -4 10 
Paraguay 1954 Stroessner Coup/Emergency/Suspension 1964 -9 0 
Peru 1919 Leguia Replacement 1923 -4 0 
Peru 1933 Benavidez Disregarded/Not Specified 1936 2 0 
Rwanda 1973 Habyarimana Replacement 1990 -7 12 
Sierra Leone 1968 Stevens Replacement 1978 1 0 
Sudan 1989 Al-Bashir Replacement 2008 -7 0 
Taiwan 1950 Chiang Kai-
shek Coup/Emergency/Suspension 1961 -8 1 
Tajikistan 1992 Rakhmonov Amendment 2003 -6 0 
Togo 1967 Eyadema Amendment 2002 -7 7 
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Country Year Leader Means of Overstay 
Overstay 
Year 
Level of 
Democracy 
Age of 
Democracy 
Tunisia 1957 Ben Ali Bourguiba Amendment 1969   
Tunisia 1987 
Zine Al-
Abidine Ben 
Ali 
Amendment 2004 -5 0 
Uganda 1986 Museveni Amendment 2005 -7 0 
Uruguay 1938 Baldomir Coup/Emergency/Suspension 1941 0 4 
Uzbekistan 1991 Karimov Amendment 1997 -9 0 
Venezuela 1870 Guzman Blanco Replacement 1873 -5 40 
Venezuela 1879 Guzman Blanco Replacement 1881 -5 49 
Venezuela 1894 Joaquin Crespo Replacement 1894 -3 64 
Venezuela 1899 Cipriano Castro Replacement 1902 -3 69 
Venezuela 1908 Gomez Replacement 1913 -3 78 
Yugoslavia 
(Serbia) 1945 Tito Amendment 1972 -7 0 
 
